Tafa’ul Process: Why It Matters for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
Why it emerged after COP16
At the sixteenth session of the UNCCD Conference of the Parties in Riyadh (COP16), the drought agenda remained politically prominent; however, Parties did not reach consensus on a comprehensive instrument, and key elements were deferred to COP17. In practice, this created a preparatory gap: formal negotiations were postponed, while underlying differences between Parties remained unresolved.
In this context, the Tafa’ul process was initiated by the COP16 Presidency (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), with support from the UNCCD secretariat, as a voluntary and informal dialogue series aimed at preparing the resumption of drought negotiations at COP17 by building trust and bridging remaining differences.
To date, two meetings have been held under this process: the first in Panama City alongside CRIC23, and the second in Bonn from 9–11 February 2026. A third and final preparatory meeting is planned for spring 2026 as part of the lead-up to COP17.
The process was framed as confidence-building and preparatory rather than as “parallel negotiations,” emphasizing open exchange and relationship-building to reduce the risk of renewed stalemate. Operationally, a key design feature was enabling frank discussion through facilitation methods and confidentiality principles, with in-person meetings structured to support the mapping of convergences and divergences and the co-development of workable options for COP17 consideration.
Progress was not framed in terms of negotiated text outcomes, but rather as improvements in working relationships and shared problem definition. The dialogue approach emphasized:
• creating a safe and inclusive environment for reflection and mutual understanding;
• an early focus on team-building and joint planning for the road to COP17;
• confidence-building to narrow misunderstandings about the scope and structure of a future drought instrument and to identify practical pathways for agreement.
Why drought is already a major CEE risk: what the last five years show
The 2022 European drought is widely assessed as one of the most consequential recent climate extremes, with continent-scale indicators showing severe hydrological and soil moisture impacts (e.g., widespread below-average river discharge, very low soil moisture, and multi-sectoral disruption). This is particularly relevant for CEE, as recent evidence demonstrates that severe drought impacts are increasingly affecting regions traditionally characterized by humid and temperate climates. Monitoring and impact datasets show substantial exposure across central, eastern, and south-eastern Europe in multiple recent years, including areas not historically considered drought-prone.
In 2024, the east–west climate contrast in Europe was particularly pronounced: eastern Europe experienced drier-than-average conditions, while western Europe was wetter, consistent with findings in the European State of the Climate report. The European Environment Agency further reports that 2024 drought conditions were drier-than-average in eastern and south-eastern Europe, with large exposed areas and measurable ecosystem productivity impacts.
Country-level examples with quantified signals (2021–2025)
The table below summarizes recent drought signals and impacts across selected CEE and neighbouring countries, prioritizing quantified indicators from reputable monitoring and reporting sources.
Where numerical values are presented for ecosystem impacts they refer to the European Environment Agency (EEA) “drought impact on vegetation productivity” indicator. This is a composite satellite-based indicator derived from Copernicus land monitoring data that measures the spatial extent and intensity of drought-related reductions in vegetation productivity relative to long-term averages.
Source: European Environment Agency. Drought impact on ecosystems in Europe.
https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/drought-impact-on-ecosystems-in-europe
Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2022 (countrywide ecosystem productivity impact); July 2025 heat and drought conditions reported in southern areas (e.g., Mostar); 2022 drought impact on vegetation productivity reported at 47.5 (indicator value) for the country; July 2025 temperatures reported reaching 41°C in Mostar amid severe drought conditions
Montenegro: 2022 drought impacts; regional Western Balkans drought conditions in 2025; 2022 drought impact on vegetation productivity reported at 25.5 (indicator value)
Serbia: 2024 summer heat/drought affecting major crops; 2025 drought affecting livestock and rural water availability (Suva Planina); 2022 drought impact on vegetation productivity reported at 15.7 (indicator value); 2024 estimates cited in reporting included 20% drop in corn production and very low irrigation coverage (1.4% of farmland irrigated); 2025 drought endangered up to 1,000 cows and horses, requiring emergency water deliveries
Romania: 2024 severe drought with strongest impacts reported in the south and east; 2025 regional yield losses in south-eastern Europe; 2024 reporting cited ~2 million hectares affected and water restrictions in 630+ localities, with compensation and insurance policy responses under discussion; 2025 EU science reporting confirmed drought/heatwave-driven yield losses in south-eastern Europe including Romania
Hungary: 2022 agricultural drought and major losses; 2025 continuing drought stress in central Hungary (Homokhátság region); 2022 drought causing ~1,000 billion forints in agricultural losses and contributing to inflation pressures; 2025 reporting described ongoing drought-driven groundwater and agricultural viability concerns and government canal/water retention measures
Bulgaria: 2024–2025 drought stress in south-eastern Europe; 2025 yield losses in south-eastern Europe; 2024 EEA reporting indicates vegetation productivity failed to recover on ~20% of Bulgaria’s territory (drought impact); 2025 JRC reporting confirms drought/heatwave-driven yield losses in south-eastern Europe including Bulgaria
Poland: 2023 drought impacts (notably northern areas); 2025 early-season soil moisture anomalies flagged by research groups and climate services; EEA reporting cites Poland among the EU countries with large absolute drought-impacted area in 2023 (around 24,000 km²); 2025 warnings based on soil moisture anomalies highlight elevated drought risk in parts of Poland.
These examples demonstrate that drought in the region is simultaneously:
a) meteorological and hydrological (rainfall deficits; low river levels);
b) agricultural and economic (yield losses; compensation and insurance debates; livelihood stress); and
c) ecological (measurable vegetation productivity impacts across large areas).
What climate science and official assessments project for drought, heat and CEE summers
The European State of the Climate 2024 report produced jointly by the Copernicus Climate Change Service (implemented by the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) concluded that 2024 was Europe’s warmest year on record and highlighted a marked east–west contrast, with extremely dry and often record-warm conditions in the east.
From a drought risk perspective, this is critical because even in cases where total precipitation does not decline sharply, higher temperatures increase evaporative demand. This accelerates soil moisture depletion and raises the likelihood of agricultural and ecological drought during hot seasons. The European Environment Agency’s first European Climate Risk Assessment (EUCRA) identifies numerous major climate risks affecting Europe’s water resources, food security, ecosystems, and infrastructure. It warns that many risks are already at critical levels and may become catastrophic without decisive action.
The IPCC AR6 assessment for Europe reports that drought, excessive rainfall, and compound drought–heat hazards have increased costs and caused economic losses in crops and livestock. It further concludes that the severity of impacts from extreme heat and drought has increased markedly over recent decades and that, under higher warming levels, hydrological drought is likely to intensify across additional European sub-regions.
Why this is especially consequential for CEE: agriculture, ecosystems, and water-dependent economies
Many CEE and Western Balkan agricultural systems remain highly exposed to rainfall variability and seasonal soil moisture conditions, while irrigation capacity is uneven or structurally limited. In Serbia, for example, only 1.4% of farmland is irrigated; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the share is even lower. This structural sensitivity increases the likelihood that meteorological drought rapidly translates into agricultural and economic drought.
At the EU level, drought is increasingly framed as a dominant driver of agricultural losses. A European Commission–supported analysis estimates that extreme weather costs EU farmers approximately €28.3 billion per year on average, with drought identified as the primary driver of losses. Although this figure reflects the EU as a whole, it underscores the broader macroeconomic relevance of drought shocks that also affect CEE food systems, commodity prices, and farm solvency.
The EEA’s drought impact indicator explicitly links drought stress to reduced vegetation productivity and warns that drought undermines ecosystem functions—including carbon sequestration—and increases wildfire risk. For CEE, the 2022 and 2024 impact patterns are particularly significant: large, measurable drought impacts were documented in parts of south-eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, with some countries experiencing substantial deviations from long-term baselines.
Drought in CEE frequently evolves into a water governance challenge, not merely an agricultural issue. In the Western Balkans, drought impacts have affected hydropower production and contributed to increased energy import costs, as observed during drought-related reductions in hydropower output in Albania.
At the macroeconomic level, water scarcity can materially threaten economic output across sectors, with agriculture particularly exposed. Persistent water shortages may propagate through commodity markets, influencing prices and inflation dynamics. For CEE countries, this framing is crucial because it connects drought policy not only to environment and agriculture ministries, but also to finance and economic planning institutions.
Readiness and governance gaps
Within the region, two notable national examples include:
• Moldova, which developed its first National Drought Management Plan in 2019 under the UNCCD Drought Initiative framework.
• Montenegro, which adopted a National Drought Plan in 2020, subsequently reviewed with the support of UNCCD and FAO partners.
These cases remain relatively uncommon in the region. Many countries continue to address drought through fragmented instruments (e.g., adaptation plans, sectoral strategies, or disaster response procedures) rather than through dedicated, risk-based drought governance frameworks with defined financing mechanisms and operational triggers.
A structural issue for CEE also lies in the UNCCD’s original definition of “affected areas,” which is primarily based on aridity categories (arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid zones). This classification can contribute to a perception that parts of Central and Eastern Europe are less central to drought priorities because they are not classically arid. However, recent evidence demonstrates that agricultural, hydrological, and ecological drought impacts are already significant across many CEE and south-eastern European countries, including those not traditionally categorized as arid.
For the Western Balkans, the Green Agenda provides an additional policy bridge between EU climate priorities and national drought resilience needs. The Sofia Declaration aligns regional objectives with the European Green Deal, while EU implementation guidance frames action around pillars directly relevant to drought resilience: climate action; cleaner air, water, and soil; sustainable food systems; and biodiversity protection. The EU4Green programme supports Western Balkan economies in implementing these priorities, including through strengthened monitoring, reporting, and climate-resilient agriculture.
Why this matters now and what it points to?
Drought in Central and Eastern Europe is no longer a marginal or occasional hazard. It has evolved into a compounding systemic risk, characterized by measurable ecosystem impacts, significant agricultural losses, and growing pressure on water governance systems. Climate assessments and peer-reviewed research consistently indicate that hotter summer conditions will increase drought intensity and the likelihood of compound drought–heat extremes, including in eastern and south-eastern Europe.
At the same time, readiness gaps persist. Regional practitioners highlight limited drought financing mechanisms, while national drought plans remain confined to a small number of countries despite escalating impacts.
This is where the relationship between the Tafa’ul process and the UNCCD Community of Learning and Practice on Drought Management (CLP) becomes strategically important. Tafa’ul plays a key role in strengthening the political feasibility of a drought instrument by building trust and bridging differences ahead of COP17. In parallel, the UNCCD Community of Learning and Practice on Drought Management provides a practitioner-level platform to translate political momentum into operational capacity, supporting drought risk assessment, finance tracking, investment planning, early warning enhancement, and cross-country implementation learning.
Importantly, this political and practitioner dialogue does not start from zero. A range of operational tools already exists under the UNCCD Drought Initiative framework. The UNCCD Drought Toolbox (https://droughtclp.unccd.int/drought-toolbox) provides an integrated online platform that supports countries across the full drought risk management cycle. The Toolbox integrates data access, case studies, methodological guidance, and links to technical resources, enabling countries to move from reactive crisis response toward risk-based drought management. These efforts align with the widely recognized three main drought pillars: (i) Monitoring and early warning; (ii) Vulnerability and impact assessment; and (iii) Mitigation, preparedness, and response planning. Recent research further emphasizes that effective drought governance requires integrating climate science, risk analytics, and institutional coordination to manage compound drought–heat risks and cascading socio-economic impacts (see, e.g., ScienceDirect, 2026, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1462901126000237).
Ultimately, drought is a transboundary challenge. Societies and ecosystems depend on shared water resources and basin-scale hydrology that transcend national borders. Resilience therefore requires coordinated, proactive action linking on-the-ground measures (soil carbon management, erosion control, water harvesting, nature-based solutions, climate-smart agriculture, and reforestation where appropriate) with institutions, monitoring systems, and financing mechanisms that can be activated before drought escalates into crisis. The complementarity of informal political dialogue (Tafa’ul), practitioner and policy stakeholders’exchange (CLPs), and technical tools (Drought Toolbox) provides a structured pathway from global negotiation to national implementation.
